Why Voluntary Contributions? Google Answers!
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Preferences? Google Answers!1
We analyse pricing, e¤ort and tipping decisions in the online service Google Answers. While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. The obtained data set is analysed and compared to the results of similar laboratory experiments, namely Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) and Gächter and Falk (2002). Reciprocal t...
متن کاملWhy urban voluntary hospitals close.
In this paper, we argue for the importance of understanding hospital closings and relocations. Broad descriptive data on closings, relocations, and other reconfigurations of beds in 52 large and mid-size U.S. cities are presented. The period covered is 1937 to 1980. Two contrasting outlooks on hospital closings and relocations are offered. As hypothesized, smaller and less specialized nonteachi...
متن کاملHighlighting - Or Why Google Is That Successful
In today’s information society, searching for information or for functions of a software application is one of the most frequent tasks. Still, visual search tasks are reported to be associated with low efficiency and user satisfaction. A simple method to improve search performance is highlighting. With the current experiment we investigate if search performance and user satisfaction can be sign...
متن کاملLearning to Rank Answers to Why-Questions
The goal of the current research project is to develop a ques tion answering system for answering why-questions (why QA). Our system is a pipeline consisting of an off-the-shelf retrieval module followed by an answer re-ranking module. In this paper, we aim at improving the ranking performance of our system by finding the optimal approach to learning to rank. More specifically, we try to find ...
متن کاملVoluntary contributions by consent or dissent
We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experim...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.670243