Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms.
This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity "strong reciprocity" and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal coop...
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In this paper, we present a cultural evolutionary model in which norms for cooperation and punishment are acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission-a tendency to copy the most successful individual; and (2) conformist transmission-a tendency to copy the most frequent behavior in the population. We first show that if a finite number of punishment stages is permitted (...
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We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, harassing behavior, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. There are complementarities in behaviors so that an agent’s payoff decreases with the mismatch between her behavior and her partner’s, a...
متن کاملStrong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms1
This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity ‘strong reciprocity’ and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal coop...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Evolutionary Economics
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0936-9937,1432-1386
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-004-0212-1