Why Hypothetical Syllogism is Invalid for Indicative Conditionals

On Indicative Conditionals

In this paper we present a new approach to evaluate indicative conditionals with respect to some background information specified by a logic program. Because the weak completion of a logic program admits a least model under the three-valued Lukasiewicz semantics and this semantics has been successfully applied to other human reasoning tasks, conditionals are evaluated under these least L-models...

Context - sensitivity and ( indicative ) conditionals

Conditionals (in particular indicatives) give rise to stand-offs that have become well known from Gibbard’s initial Sly Pete example. The stand-offs can be seen as evidence for the context-sensitivity of (indicative) conditionals and arguably do not involve disagreement. I claim that the latter feature lends credibility to an indexical treatment of indicatives. 1. Conditionals in stand-off envi...

Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions?

In this paper I will focus on the question of what theoretical object we should use to represent the meaning of certain sentences. In particular, I will focus on the question of whether we should use propositions to represent the meaning of indicative conditionals. Before getting into this question I’ll try to locate it in the broader scheme of things. In recent years, the so-called semantic/pr...

Some Remarks on Indicative Conditionals

Indicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic ep...