Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence - experimental evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Preferences or Collusion? Experimental Evidence
We study relative performance schemes in light of social preferences. To the extent players are other regarding, they internalize the negative externality they impose on other players by exerting lower e¤ort. Thus, players with other regarding preferences are more likely to initiate and sustain collusive behavior, as traditionally de ned. We nd this is indeed the case experimentally. We also ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Southern Economic Journal
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0038-4038
DOI: 10.1002/soej.12278