Why Change a Winning Team? Explaining Post-Election Cabinet Reshuffles in Four Westminster Democracies

نویسندگان

چکیده

Incumbent prime ministers who win re-election often reshuffle their cabinet ministers. These post-election reshuffles have important implications for policymaking and present a puzzle: why would alter the ‘winning team’ that has just received an electoral mandate? Existing literature largely overlooked reshuffles, so offers few compelling answers. At most, plausible but under-theorised untested conventional wisdom suggests success increases ministers’ authority over This article thus provides first systematic study of in single-party governments. It argues re-elected use temporary increase to pre-empt future leadership challenges by moving or sacking rivals. Larger election victories should produce larger reshuffles. However, analysis four ‘Westminster’ democracies since 1945 shows no support this expectation, suggesting further work is needed understand these political events.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Political Studies

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1467-9248', '0032-3217']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211049293