Wholesale Price Contracts for Reliable Supply
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Monotonicity properties of wholesale price contracts
This paper contributes to the supply chain contracts literature in economics and operations by performing qualitative sensitivity analysis of a wholesale price contract in a two-echelon supply chain setting. Ordertheory tools are used to derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity of contract parameters. The upstream supplier is modeled as a Stackelberg leader. The supplier is assumed to have...
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Supply reliability may suffer due to events such as labor strikes that disrupt capacity (random capacity) or manufacturing defects that result in yield losses (random yield). Suppliers can enhance reliability by process improvement and overproduction, but these mitigating actions are often not contractible. Moreover, the investment in mitigation depends critically on the design of the procureme...
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as corporate activities and their 7 impacts on different social groups. In this paper, CSR is considered in a two-echelon supply 8 chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm that are bound by a wholesale 9 price contract. CSR performance (the outcome of CSR conduct) of the whole supply chain is 10 gauged by a global variable a...
متن کاملSupply quality management with optimal wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts: A two-stage game approach
One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their products. However, as in other parts of supply chain management, decentralized decision-making in supply quality management is prevalent, which causes inefficiencies such as the well-known double marginalization phenomenon. Coordinating schemes, such as the revenue sharing contract, can contribut...
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We show that when a supply channel is capacity-constrained and the constraint is tight, there is a set of linear wholesale price contracts that coordinates the channel while allowing the supplier to make a profit. We prove this for the one-supplier/one-newsvendor supply channel as well as the many-supplier/one-newsvendor channel configuration (with each supplier selling a unique product). We an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Production and Operations Management
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1059-1478
DOI: 10.1111/poms.12848