Who monitors the monitors? An examination of listed companies in an emerging market context

The growing number of corporate scandals globally highlights the importance effective governance mechanisms. Many frameworks that are rooted in agency theory advocate election independent non-executive directors, an chairperson, and a lead director. Shareholder voting on or re-election directors (hereafter referred to as ‘director re-elections’) has been largely unexplored South Africa—a country widely recognised pioneer field yet marred by several recent years. In this study, unbalanced panel data set was thus constructed comprising outcomes board-level characteristics companies listed Johannesburg Stock Exchange from 2014 2020. Significant positive relationships were noted between shareholder opposition director re-elections both board size tenure. Shareholders who cast opposing votes mainly did so because their concerns about lack independence, at board, committee, nominee level. findings study explained context agency, stakeholder, stewardship, resource dependence theories. It is recommended nomination committees use more robust selection criteria for directors. also encouraged vote actively monitor these monitors.