When Pro-Poor Microcredit Institutions Favor Richer Borrowers - A Moral Hazard Story
نویسندگان
چکیده
We suggest an explanation for the existence of “mission drift”, tendency Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to lend money wealthier borrowers rather than very poor. focus on relationship between MFIs and external funding institutions. assume that both institutions are pro-poor agree optimal proportion funds be granted poorer borrower. However, asymmetric information effort chosen by MFI identify higher quality projects may increase share loans attributed borrowers. This occurs because have build incentives MFIs, creating a trade off funded attribution
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3791862