When do creditor rights work?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking
We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy affect corporate investments by reducing corporate risk-taking. In cross-country analysis, we find that stronger creditor rights induce greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying acquisitions and of firms with low-recovery assets to acquire targets with high-recovery assets. These relations are strongest in countries where manage...
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Much of our understanding of creditor rights is based on the notion that better enforcement of contracts reduces borrowing costs, thereby relaxing financial constraints. But what if these rights are too strong? We empirically investigate this question by examining the effect of a securitization reform that strengthened secured creditors rights on corporate debt structure. Strikingly, we find th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Comparative Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0147-5967
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2007.05.004