When are mixed equilibria relevant?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Mixed strategy equilibria — Nash (NE) and maximin (MM) are cornerstones of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been questionable. We study in the laboratory two games, each with a unique NE (and distinct) MM completely mixed strategies. Treatment variables include matching protocol (pairwise random vs population mean matching), whether time is discrete or continuous, players can specify explicit mixtures only pure realizations. mixes predict observed behavior relatively well treatments, better than all treatments. However, most pairwise uniform NE. Regret-based sign preserving dynamics capture regularities across
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0167-2681', '1879-1751']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.08.031