منابع مشابه
How to change it: modes of engagement, rationality, and stance voluntarism
We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change (within the framework of other ...
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Nationwide Rapid Survey on Children (RSoC), conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development and UNICEF in 2013-14 showed a marked improvement in the status of the child malnutrition over the third National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) that was conducted in 2005-06. Despite some impressive gains in the anthropometric indicators of malnutrition, the absolute levels remain high, and of c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Manuscrito
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2317-630X,0100-6045
DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.bs