What Might Machines Mean?

Abstract This essay addresses the question whether artificial speakers can perform speech acts in technical sense of that term common philosophy language. We here argue under certain conditions so understood. After (§1) explaining some issues at stake these questions, we (§2) elucidate a relatively uncontroversial way which machines communicate, namely through what call verbal signaling. But signaling is not sufficient for performance act. To explain difference, (§3) notion act developed by Austin ( How to Do Things with Words , 1962) mid-twentieth century and then discuss Strawson’s ("Intention Convention Speech Acts", 1964) influential proposal how may be related Grice’s ("Meaning", 1957) conception speaker meaning. refine synthesis light Armstrong’s ("Meaning Communication", 1971) reconceptualization meaning terms objectives rather than intentions. next (§4) extend this cases recorded, proxy, conditional acts. On basis, propose (§5) characteristic role as proxies on behalf their human creators. (§6) also consider two objections our position, compare approach others: while other authors appeal notions such “quasi-assertion,” offer sharp characterization do does impute intentions or similarly controversial powers them. conclude (§7) raising doubts strategy applied generally.