What is the myth of the given?

Abstract The idea of ‘the given’ and its alleged problematic status as most famously articulated by Sellars (1956, 1981) continues to be at the center heated controversies about foundationalism in epistemology, ‘conceptualism’ nonconceptual content philosophy perception, nature experiential given phenomenology cognitive sciences. I argue that question just what myth is supposed first place more complex than has typically been these debates, clarification this prior surprising consequences. Foundationalism was only one Sellars’s targets, not familiar sense fundamental issues stake concern very ‘objective purport’ or intentionality our empirical thinking general. When pushed further still, critique fact hinged on his diagnoses implicit framework-relative ‘categorial’ metaphysical presuppositions he exposes givenist views. Furthermore, key accordingly turns out rest assumptions concerning principle revisability replaceability any such presuppositions, whether ‘innate’ acquired, including own. Another result widespread famous simply inapplicable irrelevant either ‘thin’ nonconceptualist views (such C. I. Lewis’s), since they are ‘non-epistemic’; alternatively, ‘thick’ conceptualist phenomenological analyses (since they, too, reject ‘sense-data’ ‘bare given’)–both turn mistaken.