What determines individual trade-policy preferences?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?
This article provides new evidence on the determinants of individual trade-policy preferences using individual-level survey data for the United States. There are two main empirical results. First, we find that factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for trade barriers. Second, we find that home ownership also matters for individuals’ trade-policy preferences. Independ...
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This paper uses three years of individual-level data to analyze the determinants of individual preferences over trade and immigration policies in the United States. Different economic models make contrasting predictions about what forces should shape these preferences. We have four main empirical results. First, we find that factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for...
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This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of public opinion towards free trade, investigating cleavages both between and within countries. We study the distributional effects of trade policy in a neoclassical economy with not just two, but many input factors in production. We demonstrate that the factor price changes induced by trade policy are negatively correlated with the fact...
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Economists overwhelmingly support free international trade. According to a 2006 Economists’ Voice survey, for example, 87% of economists polled agreed that “the U.S. should eliminate remaining tariffs and other barriers to trade.” Yet a vocal community of activists opposes globalization due to concerns that trade exploits workers and the environment in the developing world. In response to these...
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Scholars have long argued that Presidents are less protectionist than Congress while Senators are less so than Representatives due to their larger constituencies. Yet until now this theory has escaped scrutiny. I argue that it is based on a misguided view of trade policy as distributive politics. I show via a series of tests that the theory is untenable. Unlike their differences in constituency...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Economics
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0022-1996
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-1996(00)00094-5