منابع مشابه
What Finitism Could Not Be *
In his paper “Finitism” (1981), W.W. Tait maintains that the chief difficulty for everyone who wishes to understand Hilbert’s conception of finitist mathematics is this: to specify the sense of the provability of general statements about the natural numbers without presupposing infinite totalities. Tait further argues that all finitist reasoning is essentially primitive recursive. In this paper...
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The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical (deterministic) physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the s...
متن کاملWhat Scientific Theories Could Not Be
According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view — if taken literally — leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one the...
متن کاملWhat Conditional Probability Could Not Be
Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of probability includes the familiar ratio formula for conditional probability: (RATIO) P(A | B) = P(A ∩ B) P (B) (P (B) > 0). Call this the ratio analysis of conditional probability. It has become so entrenched that it is often referred to as the definition of conditional probability. I argue that it is not even an adequate analysis of that concept. I prove what I c...
متن کاملWhat scientic theories could not be
According to the semantic view of scientic theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view — if taken seriously as a formal explication — leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are truly distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are truly equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relation...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0007-0882,1464-3537
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axx032