Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information

Lecture 7: May 4 7.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information

7.1.1 Definitions Definition An extensive game with perfect information 〈N,H, P, Ui〉 has the following components: • A set of N players • A set H of sequences (finite or infinite). each member of H is a history; each component of a history ia an action taken by a player. • P is the player function, P (h) being the player who takes an action after the history h. • Payoff function Ui, i ∈ N After...

Games with Perfect Information

Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information

Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) investigate a stochastic evolutionary model for extensive form games and show that even for games of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, non-subgame perfect equilibrium-strategies may well survive in the long run even when mutation rates tend to zero. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of these games Hart (2002) sho...

Infinite Games and Well-Founded Negation

We present a new characterization of the well-founded semantics [vGRS91] using an infinite two-player game of perfect information) [GS53]. Our game generalizes the standard game for ordinary logic programming [vE86]. Our proof of correctness is based on a refined version of the game, with degrees of winning and losing, which, as we demonstrate, corresponds exactly to the infinite-valued charact...

Memory and perfect recall in extensive games

The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn (1953), who interpreted it as “equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves”. We provide a syntactic and semantic characterization of perfect recall ∗I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful a...