Welfarism's Envy Problem Extends to Popular Judgments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Popular Roommates problem
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching problem in a roommates instance has been an open problem for several years and here we show it is NP-hard. A sub-class of max-size popular matchin...
متن کاملThe Unit-Demand Envy-Free Pricing Problem
We consider the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem, which is a unit-demand auction where each bidder receives an item that maximizes his utility, and the goal is to maximize the auctioneer’s profit. This problem is NP-hard and unlikely to be in APX. We present four new MIP formulations for it and experimentally compare them to a previous one due to Shioda, Tunçel, and Myklebust. We describe ...
متن کاملValue Chain Envy: Explaining New Entry and Vertical Integration in Popular Music
The desirability of establishing a value chain at a particular stage in a value system can be considered to depend on the relation between the value that can be created and the value that can be captured at that particular stage. Value chain envy motivates firms to invade the more desirable stages of the value system, either through new entry or vertical integration. The feasibility of establis...
متن کاملUniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem
We consider the unit-demand min-buying pricing problem, in which we want to compute revenue maximizing prices for a set of products P assuming that each consumer from a set of consumer samples C will purchase her cheapest affordable product once prices are fixed. We focus on the special uniform-budget case, in which every consumer has only a single non-zero budget for some set of products. This...
متن کاملPopular Matchings in the Stable Marriage Problem
The input is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B ,E) where each vertex u ∈ A ∪B ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. This is the same as an instance of the stable marriage problem with incomplete lists. A matching M∗ is said to be popular if there is no matching M such that more vertices are better off in M than in M∗. Any stable matching of G is popular, however such a matching is a mi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: AEA Papers and Proceedings
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2574-0768,2574-0776
DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181001