Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-effi ciency and strategyproofness in the context of the queueing problem. As a consequence, we provide alternative characterizations of the k-pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [13]). First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which ensures that no agent is worse off than the case where she is assigned to the k...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005