Weighted voting procedure having a unique blocker

Mathematics of Voting – Weighted Voting Systems

Generalized Weighted Majority Voting with an Application to Algorithms Having Spatial Output

In this paper we propose a method using a generalization of the weighted majority voting scheme to locate the optic disc (OD) in retinal images automatically. The location with the maximal sum of the weights of OD center candidates falling into a disc of radius predefined in the clinical protocol is chosen for optic disc. We have worked out a weighted voting scheme, where besides the weights, a...

Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?

We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open, while this is not true of Nash equilibrium for n > 2. The crucial lemma is that a unique correlated equilibrium is a quasi-s...

Voting Power in Weighted Voting Games: A Lobbying Approach by

We report experiments on the following lobbying game. Two lobbyists have identical budgets and simultaneously distribute them across voters in a legislature. Each voter votes for the lobbyist who pays them most and the lobbyist who receives most votes wins a prize. Taking the share of the budget distributed to a voter as a measure of the voter‟s voting power we investigate how voting power vari...

Weighted Approval Voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of,...