Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
Symmetric (3, 2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems...
متن کاملApproval Voting Theory with Multiple Levels of Approval
Approval voting is an election method in which voters may cast votes for as many candidates as they desire. This can be modeled mathematically by associating to each voter an approval region: a set of potential candidates they approve. In this thesis we add another level of approval somewhere in between complete approval and complete disapproval. More than one level of approval may be a better ...
متن کاملWeighted Approval Voting
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of,...
متن کاملSequential voting with abstention
Dekel and Piccione (2000) have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction ...
متن کاملApproval Voting and Parochialism
In hypothetical scenarios involving two groups (nations or groups of workers), subjects voted on three proposals: one helped group A (their group), one helped B, and one helped both groups, more than the average of the first two but less than their maximum. When subjects voted for one proposal, most voted for the one that helped group A. This result is “parochial” because it helps the voter’s o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0212-3