منابع مشابه
Capital Redistribution Brings Wealth by Parrondo’s Paradox
We present new versions of the Parrondo’s paradox by which a losing game can be turned into winning by including a mechanism that allows redistribution of the capital amongst an ensemble of players. This shows that, for this particular class of games, redistribution of the capital is beneficial for everybody. The same conclusion arises when the redistribution goes from the richer players to the...
متن کاملAnalysis of a Model for Wealth Redistribution
This paper provides a detailed analytical investigation of a kinetic model for the redistribution of wealth in a simple economy, which was proposed by Chakrabarti, Chatterjee and Manna. Estimates on the rate of convergence towards the steady state are derived, both for the finite-agent model, found in Monte-Carlo simulations, and the continuous model, corresponding to a homogeneous Boltzmann eq...
متن کاملParrondo’s paradox via redistribution of wealth∗
In Toral’s games, at each turn one member of an ensemble of N ≥ 2 players is selected at random to play. He plays either game A′, which involves transferring one unit of capital to a second randomly chosen player, or game B, which is an asymmetric game of chance whose rules depend on the player’s current capital, and which is fair or losing. Game A′ is fair (with respect to the ensemble’s total...
متن کاملGrammatical Downsizing and The Redistribution of Semantic Wealth
In this paper we explore the consequences of Grammatical Downsizing. Grammatical Downsizing occurs when the rules of morphology, phonology or syntax cause a given formative to be ill-formed in a certain context. We demonstrate with examples from Kannada and Modern Greek that Grammatical Downsizing leads to an extension of the semantic domain of some other formative, redistributing the semantic ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Archives of Business Research
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2054-7404
DOI: 10.14738/abr.811.9301