Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly and efficiently among a set of agents who have additive valuations for the goods. Here, an allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any other agent, up to the removal of one good. In addition, an allocation is deemed to be efficient if i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0038-z