Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant - Strategy Implementation

We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multi-dimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). W-Mon is the following requirement: if changing one agent’s type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the result...

Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions

In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counter-intuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—m...

Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation

Though some economic environments provide allocation rules that are implementable in dominant strategies (strategy-proof), a significant number of environments yield impossibility results. On the other hand, while there are quite general possibility results regarding implementation in Nash or Bayesian equilibrium, these equilibrium concepts make strong assumptions about the knowledge that playe...

Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies

We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing “small” gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstrating a type of nonrobustness in previous impossibility results. When gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear, we c...