Wasteful Labeling

Social Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbying

Using a general equilibrium model with endogenous policy, we explore how heterogeneity affects wasteful lobbying by sectoral interest groups. With the help of a simulation approach, we first investigate the impact of information heterogeneity on how lobbies react to a shift from a soft to a strict government budget constraint. Next, we examine how lobbying is influenced by heterogenous percepti...

Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?*

We study the consequences of hospital competition for Medicare beneficiaries’ heart attack care from 1985 to 1994. We examine how relatively exogenous determinants of hospital choice such as travel distances influence the competitiveness of hospital markets, and how hospital competition interacts with the influence of managed-care organizations to affect the key determinants of social welfare—e...

Animal research is wasteful and misleading.

Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful

I prove there exists no assignment mechanism that is strategy-proof, non-wasteful and satisfies equal treatment of equals. When outside options may exist, this strengthens the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by weakening ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. My result solves an open question posed by Erdil (2014) and complements his results on the efficient frontier of r...

Supplement to “ Wasteful sanctions , underperformance , and endogenous supervision ”

In this supplemental appendix we consider contracts that are symmetric with respect to task names and for which the amount of monitoring to be accomplished (denoted F ) is public. In this case, the sanction depends on the number of failures f of inspection, where f ∈ {0, 1, . . . , F}. Within this class, contracts which deliver increasingly large sanctions for larger numbers of inspection failu...