Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation1
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Accounting Research
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0021-8456', '1475-679X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12436