Walrasian Foundations for Equilibria in Segmented Markets

On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: Complete Contracts

This paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged. In the rst version contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specic markets adjust until markets`clear'. In the second model contract designers compete directly against one another by oering alternate contracts. It is shown that the two mod...

Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasilinear markets

In an economy with indivisible goods, a continuum of agents and quasilinear utility, we show that equilibrium exists regardless of the nature of agents’ preferences over bundles. This contrasts with results for economies with a finite number of agents, which require restrictions on preferences (such as substitutability) to guarantee existence. When the distribution of preferences has full suppo...

Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets

In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers equipped with monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its desirable fairness properties do exist. We study the dynamics of (Walrasian) envy-free pricing algorithms in this environment, showing th...

Information percolation in segmented markets

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in terms of market “connectivity,” the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities. We c...

The Computation of Counterfactual Equilibria in Homothetic Walrasian Economies