Walrasian equilibrium as limit of competitive equilibria without divisible goods

Bayesian-Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium.∗

In general rational expectations equilibrium (RES), as introduced in [12] in an ArrowDebreu-McKenzie setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game [3]. The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are suppo...

Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions

Quasiliearity is a ubiquitous and questionable assumption in the standard study of Walrasian equilibria. Quasilinearity implies that a buyer’s value for goods purchased in a Walrasian equilibrium is always additive with goods purchased with unspent money. It is a particularly suspect assumption in combinatorial auctions, where buyers’ complex preferences over goods would naturally extend beyond...

Walrasian Price Equilibrium

Auctioning divisible goods

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Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology

In a standard financial market model with asymmetric information with a finite number N of risk-averse informed traders, competitive rational expectations equilibria provide a good approximation to strategic equilibria as long as N is not too small: equilibrium prices in each situation converge to each other at a rate of 1/N as the market becomes large. The approximation is particularly good wh...