Wage regulations and shadow economy in 28 European Countries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The shadow economy beyond European public governance
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Ekonomia i Prawo
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2392-1625,1898-2255
DOI: 10.12775/eip.2020.051