Wage Flexibility under Sectoral Bargaining

Wage flexibility

Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination

In this paper, we study the impact of tax policy on wage negotiations, workers' effort, and employment when effort is only imperfectly observable. We show that the different wage-setting motives – rent sharing and effort incentives – reinforce the effects of partial tax policy measures but not necessarily those of more fundamental tax reforms. We show that a higher degree of tax progression alw...

Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision

In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in wh...

Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation∗

This article intends to apply the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and to study its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the resulting wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of distortion that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricin...

Bargaining models and identifying the wage equation

It is commonly asserted that the standard wage equation derived from bargaining theory cannot be identified. Here, it is argued that the case for this alleged failure rests on an outmoded definition of identification. Newer concepts based on non-stationarities, cointegration and reduced rank are appropriate. An empirical example applying these concepts shows that the standard model can be deriv...