منابع مشابه
Multilateral productivity comparisons and homotheticity
In this paper it is shown that a well known procedure (GEKS) of transitivizing a bilateral system of productivity comparisons is implicitly a way of imposing a homothetic structure onto the data. The main implication of this result is that deviations between the bilateral and the multilateral (GEKS) indexes can be interpreted as a measure of local deviation from the homothetic assumption. This ...
متن کاملAge, Wage and Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence
In this paper, we estimate the profile of productivity by age through the estimation of production functions. ‘Productivity’ is defined as the average contribution of age groups to the productivity of firms. Our data are a matched employer-employee dataset covering about 70,000 firms in the late 1990’s in France. We find that productivity increases with age until age 40 and then remains stable ...
متن کاملWage policy, employee turnover and productivity
In this paper, we are interested in the effect of pay incentives on labour turnover and productivity. Particularly we use personnel data from a panel of 400 shops from a UK retail chain. The firm uses perfectly flat hourly wage system with no reward for tenure or individual productivity. This system leads to the phenomenon of negative selection, where only employees with lower outside options r...
متن کاملWage interactions: comparisons or fall-back options?
This paper examines the degree to which the importance of wages elsewhere in wage determination stems from comparisons made by workers, as opposed to re°ecting unions' fall-back options in the bargaining process. The di±culty of distinguishing these hypotheses is shown in the context of a bargaining model. It is argued that the use of the wage of a `pay leader' solves the fundamental problem of...
متن کاملSocial Comparisons in Wage Delegation: Experimental Evidence
We make two contributions in this article. First, we examine whether social comparisons have behavioral effects on workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rig...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Relations industrielles
سال: 1969
ISSN: 0034-379X,1703-8138
DOI: 10.7202/027993ar