Vulnerability of Voting Paradoxes As a Criteria For Voting Procedure Selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Voting Paradoxes
The early work of Condorcet in the 18th century, and that of Arrow and others in the 20th century, revealed the complex and interesting mathematical problems that arise in the theory of Social Choice, showing that the simple process of voting leads to strikingly counter-intuitive paradoxes. I will describe some of these, focusing on several recent intriguing examples whose analysis combines com...
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What could be easier than “voting?” After all, to vote we just count how many people favor each candidate. What can go wrong with something so elementary as this? Actually, a lot. As mathematicians and others have shown over the last two centuries, once there are at least three candidates—not an atypical situation—the winner need not be whom the voters really want. Such bad outcomes may occur n...
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A family of permutations F forms a realization of a directed graph T = (V,E) if for every directed edge uv of T , u precedes v in more than half of the permutations. The quality q(F , T ) of the realization is the minimum, over all directed edges uv of T , of the ratio (|F(u, v)| − |F(v, u)|)/|F|, where |F(x, y)| is the number of permutations in F in which x precedes y. The study of this quanti...
متن کاملStackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes
We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg vot...
متن کاملStackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes
We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg vot...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3471868