Voting under time pressure
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract In a controlled laboratory experiment we investigate whether time pressure influences voting decisions, and in particular the degree of strategic (insincere) voting. We find that participants under constraints are more sincere when using widely-employed Plurality Voting method. That is, might reduce hence misrepresentation preferences. However, there no effects for Approval Voting, line with arguments this method provides incentives
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Judgment and Decision Making
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1930-2975']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009335