Voting Rules in International Organizations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Voting Rules in International Organizations
International organi.ations use a bewildering variey of voting rules-with diferent thresholds, weighting systems, veto points, and other rules that distribute influence unequally among participants. We provide a brief survey of the major voting systems, and show that all are controversial and unsatisfactory in vaious ways. While it is tempting to blame great powers or the weakness of internatio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2383469