منابع مشابه
Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution☆
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and s...
متن کاملwww.econstor.eu Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and s...
متن کاملDemocracy, Redistribution, and Inequality
In this paper we revisit the relationship between democracy, redistribution, and inequality. We first explain the theoretical reasons why democracy is expected to increase redistribution and reduce inequality, and why this expectation may fail to be realized when democracy is captured by the richer segments of the population; when it caters to the preferences of the middle class; or when it ope...
متن کاملGlobalisation, inequality and redistribution
The present paper seeks to explain the pattern of income redistribution in a globalised world of increased market income inequality and lower costs of factor mobility. In some countries, larger market income inequality has been met by an increased redistributive effort, thus keeping the distribution of disposable incomes relatively stable. In other countries, larger market inequality has been a...
متن کاملExpressive Voting and Government Redistribution*
Models of expressive voting postulate that voters will ‘consume’ ideological or moral stances on issues by voting for them, even when they are against the voter’s own narrow self interest, if the probability of being a decisive voter is low. When a voter is unlikely to sway the outcome of the vote, the odds that a voter will incur any real personal cost (a higher tax burden, for example) from h...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Surveys
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0950-0804,1467-6419
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00265.x