Voting, deliberation and truth
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation
Tax incentives can be more or less salient, i.e. noticeable or cognitively easy toprocess. Our hypothesis is that taxes on consumers are more salient to consumersthan equivalent taxes on sellers because consumers underestimate the extent of taxshifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers’ voting on taxregimes, and that experience is an effective de-biasing ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1268-9