Voting Behavior, Preference Aggregation and Tax Design

Voting Behavior, Preference Aggregation and Tax Design

The empirical evidence on voting behavior suggests that the individuals’ choice of the vote is explained, among other things, by policy issues and the voters’ partisan preferences over the party that rules the government. The evidence also indicates that the voters’ partisan preferences are the best predictor of the choice of the vote (Republican and Democratic voters tend to vote, respectively...

Preference Aggregation and Voting

In this lecture, we analyze the aggregation of diverse preferences. This enterprise proves a sobering experience and will make us question the efficacy of democracy. We uncover mostly troubling phenomena as a result of aggregating diverse preferences. We might first ask why we might want to aggregate preferences. The simple reason is that there are many decisions and actions whose implications ...

Iterative voting and multi-mode control in preference aggregation

Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

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Mechanism Design for Preference Aggregation over Coalitions

The aggregation of individuals’ preferences into a single group outcome is both well-studied and fundamental within decision theory. Historically, though, a pervasive simplification has been to strip agents of the ability to form coalitions and strategically reveal their intentions. CP techniques can address such possibilities within a restricted socialchoice framework that represents mechanism...