Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2171878