Voting behavior and budget stability

Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences

Budget Aggregation via Knapsack Voting: Welfare-maximization and Strategy-proofness

Participatory budgeting [1], which started in South America, is now gaining popularity in the US, with cities like San Francisco, Vallejo, Boston, Chicago and New York adopting this paradigm [6]. With decisions involving millions of dollars across the nation being made this way, a question arises as to how to design voting schemes to aggregate the voters’ preferences into a meaningful budget de...

Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in the Enlarged EU

In this paper, we argue that the bulk of EU budget spending can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers. Using such estimates, we compare incumbent member states' predicted budget receipts before and after eastern enlargement, and examine the impact of different voting rules in EU-27. According to our estimates eastern enlargement has large effe...

Voting Behavior, Newspapers, and Language

This paper investigates how newspaper consumption a ects political engagement. To circumvent potential endogeneity issues, I use variation in European languages as an instrument for newspaper consumption. Speci cally, I consider variation in how much physical space languages require to express some given information content. I rst estimate such language e ciency from large bilingual text compil...

Rational ignorance and voting behavior

We model a two-alternative election in which voters may acquire information about which is the best alternative for all voters. Voters differ in their cost of acquiring information. We show that as the number of voters increases, the fraction of voters who acquire information declines to zero. However, if the support of the cost distribution is not bounded away from zero, there is an equilibriu...