Voting and Values: Grassroots Elections in Rural and Urban China
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Politics and Governance
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2183-2463
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v6i2.1331