منابع مشابه
Trading Votes for Votes . ∗ A Decentralized Matching
We study vote trading—trading of votes for votes—through the tools of the matching literature. Decentralized vote trading is modeled via an algorithm that executes a sequence of binding, myopic, strictly improving pair-wise trades. We show that with binary alternatives, an odd number of voters, and separable preferences, the sequence always converges to a stable vote allocation—a distribution o...
متن کاملTrading Votes for Votes: An Experimental Study∗
Trading votes for votes is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little of its properties. We return to this old question with a laboratory experiment and a simple theoretical framework. We posit a family of minimally rational trading rules such that pairs of voters can exchange votes when mutually advantageous. Such rules always lead to stable vote allo...
متن کاملStorable votes
Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting vote...
متن کاملBuying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes
In voting systems where a mark in a fixed position may mean a vote for Alice on a ballot, and a vote for Bob on another ballot, an attacker may coerce voters to put their mark at a certain position, enforcing effectively a random vote. This attack is meaningful if the voting system allows to take receipts with them and/or posts them to a bulletin board. The coercer may also ask for a blank rece...
متن کاملTrading Votes for Votes.1 A Decentralized Matching Algorithm
Vote-trading is common practice in committees and group decision-making. Yet we know very little about its properties. Inspired by the similarity between the logic of sequential rounds of pairwise vote-trading and matching algorithms, we explore three central questions that have parallels in the matching literature: (1) Does a stable allocation of votes always exists? (2) Is it reachable throug...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Hermès
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0767-9513,1963-1006
DOI: 10.4267/2042/8999