Voter Response to Salient Judicial Decisions in Retention Elections
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Judicial Independence and Retention Elections *
Judges face retention elections in over a third of U.S. state courts of last resort and numerous lower courts. According to conventional wisdom, these elections engender judicial independence and decrease democratic accountability. We argue that in the context of modern judicial campaigns, retention elections create pressure for judges to cater to public opinion on “hot-button” issues that are ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Law & Social Inquiry
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0897-6546,1747-4469
DOI: 10.1017/lsi.2018.21