منابع مشابه
Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by o¤ering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyistsbudget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments. JEL classi cation numbers: P16, C72 Keyw...
متن کاملContestable Leaderships: Party Discipline and Vote Buying in Legislatures.∗
This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties. The model formalizes the tradeoff between resources at the leaders discretion, and the incumbents need to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading. The value of the incumbent leader’s promises of future benefits is here endogenously determined by the backbenchers’ beliefs about the extent of ...
متن کاملVote Buying
We examine the consequences of vote buying, as if this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes via up front binding payments and/or payments (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. If voters care only about outcomes and not directly about how they vote, then the party with the largest budget wins at a negl...
متن کاملLobbying: Buying and Utilizing Access
This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature’s standard assumption that “money buys policies”. Our model – in which influence-seeking requires both money to “buy access” and managerial time to “utilize access” — offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the “money-buys-policies” assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying ...
متن کاملQuadratic Vote Buying∗
A group of individuals with access to transfers seeks to make a binary collective decision. All known mechanisms they might use are either are often inefficient (e.g. voting), subject to severe collusion problems (e.g. the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism) or require the planner being informed about the distribution of valuations (e.g. the Expected Externality mechanism). I propose a simple, bud...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Quarterly Journal of Political Science
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1554-0634
DOI: 10.1561/100.00008063