Vote buying and redistribution

Abstract Vote buying is a form of political clientelism involving pre-electoral transfers money or material benefits from candidates to voters. Despite the presence secret ballots, vote remains pervasive phenomenon during elections in developing countries. While prior literature has focused on how enforced by parties and which types voters are most likely targeted, we know much less about behavioral spillover effects citizens’ demand for redistribution contributions provision public goods. In this paper, provide evidence causally affects voters’ candidate choice, support redistribution, goods provision. Using data laboratory experiment Kenya, find that double-edged sword using clientelist strategies: it attracts votes those who were offered accepted it, but also leads negative reactions rejected offer as well not money. line with its effect voting behavior, subjects’ evaluations vote-buying candidate. significantly reduces individuals’ stated preferences more government spending police law enforcement—yet, surprisingly, other welfare areas such unemployment health. We open ballots—but campaigns—reduce willingness contribute provisions.