Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities and Cardinal Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.10.4.633