Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists

Selling to Cournot oligopolists: pricing under uncertainty & generalized mean residual life

We study a classic Cournot market, which we extend to a two-stage game with endogenous cost formation: the retailers’ marginal cost represents purchases from a price-setting, revenue-maximizing supplier. Any demand uncertainty falls to the supplier, who acts first and sets the wholesale price under incomplete information concerning the retailers’ willingness-to-pay for ordering the product. We ...

VOLUNTARY ASSURANCE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE∗ by

The E-Voluntary Disclosure of Financial Information, a Jordanian Phenomenon

The aim of this study is to examine the extent to which the Jordanian companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) use their websites to disclose financial information. Furthermore, this paper examines the relationship between company’s characteristics and financial ratios (Sector, Size, Age, Return on Investment, Debt Ratio, and Market to Book Value Ratio) on one hand and the extent of finan...

Privacy Concerns, Voluntary Disclosure of Information, and Unraveling: An Experiment

Privacy Concerns, Voluntary Disclosure of Information, and Unraveling: An Experiment by Volker Benndorf, Dorothea Kübler and Hans-Theo Normann* We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative ex...

Debt and Voluntary Disclosure

In attempting to understand voluntary corporate disclosure, many empirical studies have used leverage as an explanatory variable. One reason for an association between debt and disclosure relates to the agency costs of the shareholder-bondholder conflict. By voluntarily disclosing information, shareholders may be able to reduce this agency cost. We provide an additional reason why debt and disc...