Voluntary fair value disclosures beyond SFAS 157’s three-level estimates
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Market Value of Voluntary Disclosures Concerning Information Security
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Accounting Studies
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1380-6653,1573-7136
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-016-9384-9