Viewpoint: A balance of views on collective bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Effects of Profitable Downsizing on Collective Bargaining
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn’t exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that o...
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Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality. His result is considered an improvement on Nash’s original one, since it dispenses with notions of collective rationality. Several variants of Roth’s result have been obtained in a line of subsequent works. However, all of them rely on Nash’s (1950) independence axiom. Whether or how collective rationality ca...
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We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters, and core equivalence under certain cond...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Educational Considerations
سال: 1979
ISSN: 0146-9282
DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1956