Veto players, policy change, and institutional design

Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

Veto players and terror

Democratic regimes have been linked to terrorism for contending reasons, with some scholars claiming democracy increases terrorism and others claiming it decreases terror. Corroborating evidence has been used for both relationships leading to the following puzzle: why do some democratic regimes seem to foster terrorism while others do not? We offer an explanation based on Tsbelis’s veto players...

Transposition Beyond Policy Legacies and Veto Players? The Case of Anti-Discrimination Policy in Austria

The transposition of European Union directives involves the reconciliation of domestic and European interests. More often than not, domestic politics overrule European requirements to comply in a timely and correct manner. This domestication of the transposition process has often been observed in states belonging to the “world of domestic politics”, one of the least researched country clusters ...

Globalization, Veto Players, and Welfare Spending

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Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probabil...