Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Vertical Integration , Market Foreclosure and Quality Investment *
Incentives to vertically integrate are studied in an industry where downstream firms are vertically differentiated. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs impact quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. A firm, integrating first, always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Portuguese Economic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1617-982X,1617-9838
DOI: 10.1007/s10258-011-0074-z