Vertical integration and investor protection in developing countries

Investor Protection and Asset Pricing∗

Corporations in most countries are run by controlling shareholders, who have substantially smaller cash flow rights than their control rights in the firm. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of outside minority investors by diverting resources away from the firm and distorting corporate investment and payout policie...

The Effect of Business Cycle Fluctuations on Import Protection in Selected Developing Countries

In recent decades, theorists proposed the role of domestic components such as interior active groups, policies and macroeconomic indicators on determination of protection policies. In the context of recent studies, this study has investigated the effect of business cycle fluctuations on import protection for selected developing countries in 1995-2011 by using dynamic panel data method. Furtherm...

The Theory of Political Tariff Protection for Agricultural Sector in Developing Countries

This paper aims to analyze tariff protection policies in the agricultural sector of developing countries. The agricultural tariff structure in developing countries is characterized by: i) high average tariffs, ii) the existence of tariff escalation, iii) dispersion of nominal tariffs across tariff lines, and iv) a wide gap between average nominal tariffs and import-weighted average tariffs. Con...

Democracy, Risk Protection and Inequality in Developing Countries

The Effect of Investor Protection

This paper tests the hypotheses that poor investor-protection environments lead to higher information asymmetry in security markets. We compare China-based stocks, which operate in a relatively unprotected environment, to Hong Kong-based stocks. The information component in the market friction of China stocks is shown to be up to 20% larger than that of Hong Kong-based stocks. The effect is rob...